Submitted to the Home Affairs Committee Enquiry on changes proposed to the 'Earned Settlement' on the 2nd of December on behalf of India Labour Solidarity and Brighton Ambedkar Reading Circle.
The Government’s proposed “earned settlement” model for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) risks entrenching a permanent second tier of migrant workers, particularly among low‑paid and care workers, while degrading family life and refugee protection in ways that are difficult to reconcile with the UK’s human‑rights obligations and economic needs. The changes should not be applied retrospectively to migrants who made life‑changing decisions under the existing 5‑year rules, and the proposed 15‑year route for so‑called “low‑skilled” workers and 20‑year route for people seeking asylum are disproportionate, punitive and unsupported by evidence on integration or labour‑market contribution.[1][2][3][4][5]
The Government proposes to increase the standard qualifying period for settlement from 5 to 10 years, with an even longer 15‑year route for migrants in roles below RQF level 6, many of whom are care workers on Health and Care visas. At the same time, it proposes to hard‑wire No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) into settlement routes and to raise English language requirements (typically CEFR B2, roughly higher than current A2/B1 levels) for both main applicants and dependants, alongside a contribution‑based points system focused on work, taxable income and volunteering.[3][4][6][1]
These reforms are framed as ensuring a “fairer” settlement pathway that rewards economic and civic contribution and allegedly corrects a trend towards “lower‑skilled” settlement. However, the Government’s own consultation documents acknowledge that growth in work‑route settlement in recent years has been driven by lower‑paid roles (particularly health and care) and by dependants, implicitly signalling that the new model is designed to throttle settlement for precisely those workers who have held up the NHS and social‑care system through a period of crisis.[4][3]
Extending the qualifying period from 5 to 10 or 15 years multiplies visa fees, Immigration Health Surcharge payments, legal costs and employer sponsorship costs over a far longer period, disproportionately affecting lower‑income households who already struggle with cash‑flow and savings. For migrants subject to NRPF, the lack of a social safety net means that a single income shock job loss, illness, pregnancy, or a disability in the family can trigger both destitution and immigration non‑compliance, because rent arrears, council‑tax debt and NHS debts now count against “suitability” and future settlement.[2][7][1][3][4]
Evidence on the UK’s “hostile environment” shows that restrictions on access to housing, healthcare, banking and welfare for people with precarious status have already produced severe hardship for an estimated 1.3 million people with valid leave but NRPF, undermining health, education and social participation. Extending this condition for an extra 5–10 years, and adding the threat that accessing public funds will lengthen or block the route to settlement, effectively forces low‑paid migrants to subsidise the welfare state through taxes while being excluded from its protections, thereby institutionalising a second class of workers in key sectors such as social care, hospitality and logistics.[2][3][4]
The proposed contribution‑based system explicitly favours high earners, those in RQF 6+ roles and those able to display continuous full‑time employment without breaks, while disadvantaging part‑time workers, those on insecure contracts, and those who take time out for caring responsibilities. Legal analyses of the new model highlight that lower‑skilled routes (below RQF 6) are likely to face 15‑year pathways and stricter income–contribution thresholds, with far fewer opportunities for accelerated settlement. This architecture elevates “ideal workers” with uninterrupted earnings and penalises those, often women and racialised migrants, whose labour is essential but undervalued and low‑paid in the formal labour market.[6][8][1][4][2]
Global research on temporary and restricted migration regimes shows that long‑term temporariness increases employer power, suppresses wages and facilitates exploitation, because workers’ right to remain is tied to employment and cannot be easily transferred. Moving UK work routes onto 10–15 year “probation” periods, with severe sanctions for reliance on benefits or any perceived breach of “good character”, risks reproducing this pattern at scale, creating a cohort of workers who are structurally unable to assert labour rights, challenge unsafe conditions or leave abusive employers without jeopardising their immigration trajectory.[8][1][2]
Care workers sit at the sharpest edge of these proposals: they are classified as “lower‑skilled” despite often performing complex, intimate and emotionally demanding work for older and disabled people, under conditions of chronic understaffing and low pay. The consultation contemplates a 15‑year qualifying period for those below RQF 6, precisely at the moment when the Health and Care visa route has been tightened through higher salary thresholds, removal of new dependants for many care workers, and the closure of some lower‑paid care roles.[1][3][4]
These workers migrated under a 5‑year settlement expectation and fulfil vital public‑service functions, particularly in residential and domiciliary care, yet now face being reclassified onto an extended, insecure trajectory without any misconduct on their part. Retrospectively moving the goalposts in this way breaches legitimate expectations and is likely to heighten labour‑market churn, as workers look to other countries with more secure routes or leave the sector altogether, deepening already acute recruitment crises in social care across the UK.[9][3][4][1]
Migrants already in the UK have planned their lives - marriage, children’s education, mortgages, business investments- on the basis of a 5‑year route to ILR, supported by existing Immigration Rules and official guidance. To apply a 10‑ or 15‑year requirement to these cohorts would amount to retroactive policy, extinguishing settled expectations without compensatory measures, and running counter to broader principles of legal certainty and fairness that underpin the UK’s public‑law tradition.[9][4][6]
From an equality and human‑rights perspective, such changes would likely have a disparate impact on racialised communities and women, who are over‑represented in low‑paid and caring roles and among dependants, thereby engaging the Public Sector Equality Duty and the UK’s obligations under instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. At minimum, any reform should include a clear non‑retrospectivity clause: people who entered the UK, or were granted leave, on pathways explicitly described as 5‑year routes to settlement should retain access to ILR on those terms.[5][2]
The new model’s insistence that dependants independently meet higher English and contribution thresholds fragments family unity and introduces significant gender bias, because many dependants (especially women) are in unpaid care roles or part‑time work. Legal commentary notes that, unlike in the current framework where dependants usually align with the main applicant after 5 years, the proposed rules could see spouses and children left behind on temporary status, or forced into insecure work and rushed language preparation primarily to satisfy immigration criteria rather than authentic integration goals.[4][6]
Raising mandatory English to B2/GCSE level across the board ignores well‑documented socio‑economic barriers to language learning, including time constraints, caring responsibilities and the cost and availability of accredited courses, particularly outside major cities. Rather than supporting integration, this risks excluding long‑standing residents from settlement solely on linguistic grounds, despite evidence that broader social‑policy investments—in housing, anti‑poverty measures, anti‑discrimination enforcement and inclusive public services—are stronger predictors of cohesion than any single language test.[5][2]
The suggestion of a 20‑year route to settlement for people granted protection status, with multiple 3‑year extensions, entrenches a form of indefinite temporariness that conflicts with the Refugee Convention’s objective of durable solutions and local integration. Requiring repeated extensions exposes refugees to administrative errors, changing evidential thresholds and policy swings, while limiting their ability to secure long‑term housing, stable employment and mental‑health recovery from trauma.[3][2]
At the same time, recent UK policy has criminalised or penalised asylum‑seekers who arrive via “irregular” routes, including small boats or via student and visitor visas, despite the absence of workable mechanisms to apply for asylum in British embassies or consulates abroad. Independent research has found that the UK’s focus on closing regular routes, restricting access to support and using detention‑like accommodation has deepened the “hostile environment” without reducing forced migration pressures, while undermining refugee protection and integration outcomes.[2][5]
Evidence on migration and social cohesion in the UK shows that new migration flows per se have limited negative impact on cohesion; instead, pre‑existing deprivation, segregation and exclusionary policies are the strongest predictors of local tensions. Policies that restrict access to services, exacerbate poverty and mark migrants as permanently temporary are likely to undermine trust, participation and identification with the UK, counteracting any rhetorical goal of “earned” belonging.[5][2]
From a labour‑market perspective, turning essential workers into long‑term temporary migrants may reduce the UK’s attractiveness relative to competitor countries that offer clearer, shorter routes to settlement for health, care and other key sectors. Scotland’s debates on tailored migration routes, and other OECD examples, suggest that regions and countries which link work‑migration to realistic settlement opportunities are better placed to meet demographic challenges, fill skills gaps and maintain public support for migration than those that rely on long‑term precarity.[8][1][9][4][5]
Internationally, “earned citizenship” and contribution‑based settlement models have proliferated, but comparative research shows that when contribution is measured narrowly (by income, tax and formal employment), such systems systematically exclude low‑paid, racialised and female migrants while overstating their fiscal “burden”. Countries that have adopted very long or repeatedly renewable temporary statuses, such as extended guest‑worker schemes, have experienced entrenched labour segmentation, wage suppression and limited integration, prompting later reforms to provide more secure status to long‑term residents.[8][5]
By contrast, integration scholarship stresses that early security of residence, access to rights, anti‑discrimination protections, and investment in language and civic participation programmes are associated with better long‑term outcomes in education, employment and political participation. In this light, the UK’s proposed shift away from a 5‑year ILR norm towards 10–15‑year and 20‑year pathways runs against the grain of evidence‑based integration policy and risks recreating internationally discredited “guest worker” regimes.[5]
If contribution is to guide settlement decisions, it must be defined in a way that recognises:
· Paid and unpaid care work, including child‑rearing, elder care and disability support, which sustains the social reproduction on which the wider economy depends.[2][5]
· Continuity of lawful residence, community participation, schooling of children and civic engagement (e.g. volunteering, union organising, mutual‑aid work), not just taxable earnings or high salaries.[4][5]
· Structural barriers that shape contribution opportunities, including discrimination, regional labour‑market inequalities, visa‑related work restrictions and the impact of NRPF on formal employment.[2][5]
A more balanced model would treat 5 years’ lawful residence, combined with basic English and a good‑character test, as sufficient for ILR in most cases, with additional recognition, but not higher hurdles, for positive community and economic contributions. Earnings‑based acceleration could coexist with strong floors that protect low‑paid workers and carers from being permanently deferred.
To mitigate harm and comply with domestic and international obligations, any reform should build in clear exemptions and transitional protections:
· Non‑retrospectivity: preserve the 5‑year rule for all migrants already on routes that were explicitly marketed or documented as leading to ILR in 5 years.
· Sectoral exemptions: allow shorter routes (e.g. 5 years) for health and care workers, seasonal agricultural workers transitioning into long‑term roles, and other essential services, reflecting chronic labour shortages and public reliance on their work.[1][3][9]
· Human‑rights exemptions: exempt survivors of domestic violence, trafficking, serious illness or disability, and their families from NRPF and extended contribution tests, recognising heightened vulnerability.[2]
· Family‑unity protections: re‑align dependants’ eligibility with main applicants, drop separate earnings tests for spouses, and provide flexible language‑support programmes rather than punitive thresholds that split families.[6][4]
· Refugee protections: restore a realistic, short route to permanent status for refugees and people with humanitarian protection (e.g. 5 years), and expand safe pathways rather than criminalising irregular arrival in the absence of embassy‑based asylum procedures.[5][2]
On the evidence available, extending settlement qualification periods to 10 and 15 years for workers and to 20 years for people seeking asylum will deepen precarity, weaken labour standards, harm integration and family life, and create a structurally exploited tier of migrant workers who are indispensable yet perpetually excluded from full membership. For India Labour Solidarity, Brighton Ambedkar Reading Circle and allied organisations, the priority is clear: maintain a 5‑year norm for ILR; protect existing cohorts from retrospective disadvantage; design contribution measures that value care, community and lawful residence alongside paid work; and ensure that refugees and low‑paid workers have secure, humane and realistic routes to settlement that reflect their central role in the UK’s economy and society.[3][9][1][4][8][5][2]
Sources:
7. https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2020/06/A-new-settlement-for-the-low-paid.pdf
8. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629818304384
10. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/measurement-framework-interactive.pdf